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Abstract
1. Managing the footprint of highly mobile fishing fleets is increasingly important 
due to continuing declines in fish populations. However, social- ecological drivers 
for fisher behaviour remain poorly understood for many fleets globally.
2. Using the Sri Lankan fleet as a case study, we explored the role of social, envi-
ronmental and policy drivers of effort distribution and illegal fishing. We used 
semi- structured interviews and participatory mapping with 95 fishers, combined 
with explanatory modelling (GLM) and multivariate statistics, including principal 
component analysis (PCA).
3. Our findings highlighted the broad footprint (~3,800,000 km2) of this fleet, with 
fishing effort expended in high seas (53.9%), domestic (40.9%) and, illegally, in 
foreign waters (5.2%). Twenty- six per cent of fishers directly admitted to fishing il-
legally in foreign waters during interviews, whereas 62% of fishers indicated doing 
so during participatory mapping.
4. GLMs explained underlying decisions of where to fish (36% of the total deviance 
in effort distribution) as a function of social variables (14%), notably distance from 
landing sites (13%), and environmental variables (11%), notably sea surface tem-
perature (10%).
5. Multivariate analysis revealed that individual fisher characteristics associated with 
illegal fishing, such as a level of reliance on sharks, vary across the fleet. The analy-
sis of qualitative data suggested that the influence of interpersonal and commu-
nity social networks and perceptions of higher catch value, particularly of sharks, 
may be important.
6. Our approach demonstrated the utility of mixed methods research, including the 
collection of qualitative data, for creating a detailed understanding of spatial be-
haviour, including decisions of whether to fish illegally.
7. Results highlighted the importance of adopting a social- ecological lens to investi-
gate drivers for human behaviour and non- compliance with rules. We advocate for 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
As a consequence of depleted coastal fish populations, many fleets 
are expanding beyond national Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 
to high seas areas (Sumaila et al., 2015; Tickler et al., 2018). If in-
adequately monitored and managed, this can lead to overfishing, 
particularly of economically valuable migratory species, such as 
tunas (McWhinnie, 2009; Pons et al., 2018), and vulnerable spe-
cies, such as elasmobranchs, which are frequently caught as bycatch 
(Campana, 2016). Therefore, understanding and managing the spatio-
temporal fishing pressure of highly mobile fleets is paramount for pro-
tection of ocean diversity (Branch et al., 2006; Van Putten et al., 2012).
Spatial management policies, including Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs), are increasingly proposed as a way of managing fishing 
effort distribution, and plans to protect all or some of the high 
seas in this manner are currently being debated (Sala et al., 2018; 
Sumaila et al., 2015). However, the attainment of expected social- 
ecological benefits from these policies is highly reliant on human 
responses, including adherence and willingness to change fishing 
behaviours (Castrejón & Charles, 2020). Notably, illegal incursion 
of foreign fleets into designated management areas, including 
EEZs, is an ongoing problem for many countries globally (Arias 
et al., 2016; Bergseth et al., 2015). In order to predict and manage 
the compliance of fleets, a detailed understanding of what social 
factors motivate spatiotemporal distribution of fishing effort is 
required (Castrejón & Charles, 2020; Sutinen & Kuperan, 1999). 
We define ‘social factors’ from hereon as including both social and 
economic considerations.
Identifying which social factors are of importance on a fleet- 
specific basis can be difficult and time- consuming, leading them 
often to be poorly considered in understanding of spatial and 
compliance behaviour of fleets (Kaplan et al., 2010; van Putten 
et al., 2012). This can contribute to unintended feedback be-
haviours, including the displacement of fishing effort to more vul-
nerable areas, or non- compliance with spatial management policies, 
such as MPAs, due to confusion or a lack of alternatives (Castrejón 
& Charles, 2020; Mizrahi et al., 2019). Historically, behaviours were 
primarily explained by economic drivers (Sutinen & Kuperan, 1999). 
For example, profit maximisation and compliance theories, which 
both imply that fishers will make decisions, either individually or 
collectively, that achieve the greatest difference between revenue 
and costs (Branch et al., 2006; Hilborn & Kennedy, 1992; Robinson 
& Pascoe, 1997; Sumaila et al., 2006). However, research now 
increasingly recognises the importance of other social factors such 
as social networks or traditions and expertise of fishers (Belhabib 
& Le Billon, 2020; Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Klain & Chan, 2012; van 
Putten et al., 2012). Accordingly, fisheries and conservation research 
increasingly advocates for better integration of broader social fac-
tors (Fulton et al., 2011; Solomon et al., 2020).
New technologies, including Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) 
have made it easier to characterise and track spatial behaviour 
and to identify non- compliance (Joo et al., 2015). VMS is generally 
considered well- adopted within regulations pertaining to high seas 
fleets, as a legal prerequisite for vessels engaging in high seas activ-
ities across many countries (Dunn et al., 2018). However, the under-
standing of spatial movement for some fleets remains hindered by 
non- compliance with, or slow adoption of VMS regulations (Thiault 
et al., 2017). Collecting participatory data from fishers can provide a 
complementary data source (Shepperson et al., 2014). Participatory 
mapping, a term which encompasses approaches and techniques 
that capture spatial knowledge, including historical behaviours and 
perceptions, is increasingly applied in marine social- ecological re-
search (Kafas et al., 2017; Selgrath et al., 2018). By capturing fisher 
perceptions of marine spaces and social drivers for behaviours, it 
can help to predict and manage human responses to spatial man-
agement (Brown & Weber, 2012; Cinner et al., 2014). Yet, it remains 
underused for highly mobile fishing fleets (Moore et al., 2017).
In this study, we combined participatory and qualitative data 
collection methods with geospatial statistics, in order to map 
and understand the spatial distribution and compliance of the Sri 
Lankan offshore fishing fleet. This fleet is known to operate over 
a large ocean area and is suspected of relatively high levels of il-
legal fishing in foreign EEZs (FEEZs, hereafter referred to simply 
as ‘non- compliance’). Firstly, we used participatory mapping and 
semi- structured interviews to identify the spatial footprint of the 
fleet. Secondly, we quantified the potential role of social, environ-
mental and spatial management policy (herein referred to as ‘pol-
icy’) variables on fishing activity by building explanatory GLMs. 
Thirdly, we used analysis of qualitative data to explore social vari-
ables affecting non- compliance and used multivariate statistics, 
including Principal Component Analysis (PCA), to identify vessel 
and fisher characteristics that may be diagnostic of higher risk 
of non- compliance. We compare our results with existing knowl-
edge of behaviours for this fleet and discuss the importance of 
our findings within the context of national and regional policy and 
management.
a nuanced approach to monitoring and managing of fleets, including investigating 
localised social drivers for illegal fishing and enhancing regional transparency in 
fleet monitoring.
K E Y W O R D S
conservation rule- breaking, illegal, unreported and unregulated, Marine Protected Areas, 
participatory methods, sharks, Sri Lanka
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2  | METHODS
2.1 | Case study
This study considers the semi- industrial fleet of Sri Lanka, locally re-
ferred to as multi- day vessels or ‘IMULs’ (herein ‘IMULs’). IMULs are 
medium- sized vessels (9– 17 m), operated by crews of three to 10 
men who typically target high- value pelagic species, such as tuna and 
sharks, using gillnets and/or long- lines (Collins et al., 2020). Equipment 
on- board vessels are broadly homogenous, with all vessels reliant on 
ice- holds to store catch and an absence of advanced technologies, 
such as fish finders. In 2018, there were 4,508 IMULs, operating from 
~14 harbours in Sri Lanka, of which 1,346 were licensed for high seas 
fishing (National Fisheries Data, 2019). To operate in high seas, vessels 
are required to hold a High Seas Licence (HSL) and operate a function-
ing VMS. While characteristics such as vessel size and desired eco-
nomic returns are thought to be important, drivers of spatiotemporal 
effort for this fleet remain poorly understood (Amarasinghe, 2013).
Recent analysis of VMS data from this fleet shows a broadly com-
pliant fleet with a wide spatial footprint, reaching distant waters such 
as Somalia and Mauritius (Gunasekara & Rajapaksha, 2016). However, 
IMUL vessels have been repeatedly arrested for illegally fishing in 
foreign waters, such as Seychelles, India and British Indian Ocean 
Territory (BIOT), over the last three decades (Amarasinghe, 2013; 
Hays et al., 2020; Tickler et al., 2019). Given this inconsistency, 
there is a perceived need for alternative approaches to collecting 
data on fleet behaviour. This is particularly critical when consid-
ering the implications of non- compliance for sustainable develop-
ment. Notably, in 2014 the European Union introduced sanctions 
following continued evidence of non- compliance, banning the im-
ports of seafood valued at $90 million per annum in 2013 (European 
Commission, 2014; Sri Lanka faces EU fish export ban, 2014). More 
broadly, non- compliance has been shown to erode the effectiveness 
of spatial management policies, such as MPAs, and threaten global 
fisheries sustainability (Sumaila et al., 2020). Accordingly, the illegal 
activity of IMULs has been blamed for dramatic population declines 
in sharks in BIOT MPA (Graham et al., 2010; Tickler et al., 2019).
2.2 | Study approach
We selected two sites on the south and west coasts of Sri Lanka 
that had reported connections to illegal fishing (Martin et al., 2013). 
Sites for this study are defined as places for landing and berth of 
IMUL vessels with associated facilities, including commercial fish 
markets. Cumulatively, 9% of all nationally registered IMULs land to 
both sites and they are roughly similar in terms of size (5% and 4% 
land to sites 1 and 2 respectively) and associated facilities (National 
Fisheries Data, 2019). Due to the sensitive nature of collected data, 
site names and locations are anonymised throughout.
We used two main methods concurrently, namely semi- 
structured interviews and participatory mapping. Data were col-
lected over 32 days from June to August 2019 by three Sri Lankan 
researchers (co- authors IW, DW and AB, affiliated with Sri Lankan 
NGO Oceanswell), who were trained in- situ over a 1- month period, 
during which methods were also piloted with 10 fishers. Only fish-
ers in charge of vessel navigation (i.e. skippers) were investigated, 
as preliminary results suggested they were more comfortable with 
spatial data than other crew members.
All methods and interviews were carried out in Sinhalese, and 
ethical approval was granted by the University of Exeter board (Ref: 
eCORN001727 v4.1). Insights generated from qualitative and quan-
titative data were combined in an iterative manner throughout data 
processing (Figure 1). Findings from both data types are presented 
together for some of the results section. For example, fisher quotes 
identified from analysis of qualitative data are used to contextualise 
and support findings derived from quantitative data. All data pro-
cessing and analysis were carried out by the first author.
2.3 | Data collection
Using convenience sampling, a form of non- probability sampling 
used to select participants (Newing, 2010), researchers approached 
fishers at sites and explained project purpose, anonymity and con-
fidentiality. All study participants gave verbal informed consent 
F I G U R E  1   Workflow schematic 
showing individual steps involved in 
data collection and processing to map 
spatiotemporal effort and identify social, 
environmental and policy drivers for 
behaviour, including non- compliance
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(participants may have been uncomfortable with written consent). 
Then, individual fishers (n = 95) completed a mapping exercise and 
semi- structured interview in a quiet area. The mapping exercise 
collected information on: (a) spatiotemporal effort, (b) perceived 
economic importance of fishing areas and (c) proportional contri-
bution of target and bycatch species, pertaining to the time period 
2014– 2019 (additional details in Supplementary Detail (SD) 1: Data 
collection). The semi- structured interview, comprised of 35 open- 
ended and closed questions, collected information on: (a) socio- 
demographics of fishers, (b) vessel characteristics, (c) vessel fishing 
strategy and (d) fisher perceptions of governance and management 
(Table S1). With fisher permission, dialogue was audio recorded 
during both methods (average duration was 42 min, range was 28– 
57 min), and researchers prompted fishers to explain their answers 
throughout, in order to provide an additional source of qualitative 
data in the form of conversation transcripts. Following data collec-
tion, all recordings were transcribed and translated to English.
Due to the sensitive nature of data, there was a high likelihood 
of both response bias, giving an answer perceived as desirable to 
the facilitator, and non- response bias, refusing to answer all or 
some questions (Arias et al., 2015). We mitigated this by explain-
ing that data were collected for a student project, by asking sensi-
tive questions towards the end and by cross- method triangulation, 
which uses multiple methods to address bias created by one and 
broaden perspectives gained on an issue (Bryman, 2016; Travers 
et al., 2019). Further details are included (SD 2: Methodology 
considerations).
2.4 | Thematic analysis framework
In order to identify important social, environmental and policy 
variables for further analysis, we reviewed key scientific litera-
ture on spatiotemporal effort of fisheries (Bertrand et al., 2007; 
Castrejón & Charles, 2020; Daw, 2008; Kellner et al., 2007) and com-
pliance with spatial management policies (Arias et al., 2015; Béné 
& Tewfik, 2001; Hall- Arber et al., 2009; Van Putten et al., 2012; 
Raemaekers et al., 2011; Read et al., 2011). This review was also used 
to build a thematic analysis framework (Table 1) for the purpose of 
analysing qualitative data.
2.5 | Analysis of qualitative data
In order to generate insight into important variables that may af-
fect spatial behaviour and non- compliance for this fleet, quali-
tative data were coded against our thematic analysis framework 
(Table 1). Data from mapping transcripts and interviews were 
compiled and coded within NVivo software (NVivo, 2020). 
Coding was conducted in an iterative manner, whereby codes 
within the thematic analysis framework can be re- arranged hier-
archically and redefined multiple times if they do not fit the data 
(Bryman, 2016). This process continued until we were satisfied no 
new meaning or interpretation can be gleaned from data analysis, 
a process called data saturation (Newing, 2010). Findings are pre-
sented throughout the results section to contextualise quantita-
tive data, and separately to illustrate insights generated regarding 
non- compliance.
2.6 | Processing spatial data
A database of fisher and vessel characteristics was built from in-
terview data, creating categories for non- continuous and non- 
numerical data and assigning numerical values (a process called 
dummification) (Bryman, 2016). Categories were created after 
initial familiarisation with the data, and re- evaluated and redefined 
throughout data processing in an inductive approach. Then, fisher 
maps were digitised (using geo- referencing tools) and created as in-
dividual shapefiles (n = 95) using QGIS (QGIS.org, 2020). Data per-
taining to fishing activities, taken from the mapping activity, were 
related to geographical location. In order to understand compliance 
with spatial and management policies, proportion of annual effort 
expended within FEEZs (%) was calculated for each fisher using an 
overlap analysis tool in QGIS. Shapefiles were combined and over-
laid with a grid, with 0.5° resolution at the equator (an area roughly 
equivalent to ~2,500 km2), chosen as a trade- off between obtaining 
the highest spatial resolution and minimising spatial autocorrelation 
(Cabanellas- Reboredo et al., 2014).
Through our literature review and thematic analysis of qualita-
tive data, we identified potentially important social variables (see 
Table 2). Data for these were extracted from interview and mapping 
data for each grid cell. Environmental variables were accessed (see 
Table 2) and extracted using the raster package in r (Hijmans & van 
Etten, 2020). For policy variables, jurisdiction for each cell was des-
ignated by generating a categorical variable, as a function of whether 
it was within domestic (Sri Lankan EEZ), high seas or foreign country 
waters.
2.7 | Modelling of spatiotemporal effort
We modelled spatiotemporal effort using total number of fishing 
days (per grid cell) as the response variable (rv). This was calculated 
by multiplying proportion of total annual fleet effort per grid (%) by 
total number of fleet fishing days summed for all sampled vessels 
(n = 21,280 days).
Data exploration, guided by a protocol designed to minimise com-
mon statistical errors, was then conducted to detect outliers, het-
erogeneity of variance, collinearity and dependence of observations 
following the recommendations of Zuur et al. (2010). Our protocol in-
cluded (a) linear modelling to confirm a significant effect, (b) boxplots 
fishing days (rv) =
∑
(annual fishing per grid)
∑
(annual fishing effort for all grids)
× total fishing days.
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(categorical factors) and dot charts (continuous factors) to look for 
potential outliers, (c) histograms and Q– Q plots to assess variable nor-
mality and (d) pair plots to assess variable collinearity. In order to check 
for collinearity, a correlation coefficient matrix and correlation scat-
terplots were created (SD 4). To check for redundancy and multicol-
linearity, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated (SD 4). Social 
variables were also visualised spatially to look for spatial distribution 
patterns (Figure S1). Data exploration led to vessel size, cost of fishing 
and distance to FEEZ being excluded from modelling.
Fisheries effort was right- skewed (see Figure S2 for response 
variable distribution) and was therefore modelled using GLMs with 
a Gaussian family and ‘log’ link function. All models were run with R 
statistical software (R Core Team, 2020). Using the MuMIn package 
(Barton, 2020), we employed the step function to perform backward 
model selection, using each model's Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
adjusted for sample size (AICc) as the selection criterion to choose the 
most parsimonious model. Alternative models, with a delta AIC (Δm) 
≤2 were compared with each other and a null model (intercept only; 
Table S3). Standardised coefficients were calculated for the best mod-
els to compare effect sizes, and partial residual plots used to visualise 
effects. Deviance explained was calculated for each GLM.
To account for potential spatial autocorrelation (SAC), we imple-
mented the residuals autocovariate (RAC) approach (Crase et al., 2012). 
Following model selection, residuals were calculated for each grid and 
used to compute the autocovariate, a measure of similarity between 
the value of the rv at a location and neighbouring locations, by a focal 
calculation. The autocovariate is included as an additional variable and 
modelling run again. A Moran's test, on model residuals, confirmed the 
RAC method was successful in accounting for SAC (p < 0.001).
In order to determine the relative importance of each variable, 
we calculated Akaike weight (AICw) across all models, by creating 
all possible submodels (dredge function, MuMin package) from the 
full model (containing all variables). This gives a value of 0 (variable 
not deemed useful within models) to 1 (essential variable across all 
TA B L E  1   Thematic analysis framework used to identify important variables that influence spatiotemporal effort and non- compliant 
aspects of fisher behaviour. This framework was used for analysis of qualitative data
Category Subcategory Description
Framework 1: Identification and interpretation of factors explaining the spatial distribution of vessels
Factors explaining 
spatial distribution
Social Governance and management, incl. licensing regulations, perceptions of management, subsidies
Facilities and equipment, incl. limitations and possibilities of vessel equipment, impact of landing 
and market facilities
Expected value of catch, incl. expected catch volume and quality and microeconomics (such as 
market value and dynamics)
Fishing costs, incl. breakdown and effect of costs
Social networks, incl. communication between fishers, organisation of vessel networks and 
coordination during fishing activities
Historical fishing practices, incl. site fidelity, traditional fishing knowledge and practices
Environmental Bio- ecological factors, incl. target species distribution, geomorphology of fishing areas
Climatic factors, incl. seasonality, weather and climate conditions
Spatial policy and 
management
Effect of spatial- based regulations, incl. response to regulations, displacement of effort, fishing 
the line and rate of incursions
Framework 2: Identification and interpretation of factors explaining compliance with spatial management policies
Factors affecting 
non- compliance
Economic gains Perceived benefits of non- compliance, incl. expected catch volume and quality, change to fishing 
time and associated costs
Economic necessity Perceived necessity of non- compliance, incl. accrued debt, reliability of income, effect of vessel 
costs




Influence of target species, incl. fishing site locations, expected catch
Social norms Injunctive norms, incl. perceptions of which behaviours are typically approved or disapproved, 
within immediate interpersonal networks (such as on a vessel) and within the wider community
Descriptive norms, incl. perceptions of other behaviours, perceptions of acceptability of 
non- compliance
Social networks Interpersonal and wider community networks, incl. sharing of knowledge and coordinated 
nature of behaviours
Corruption Corruption, incl. presence and ability to ameliorate social cost of non- compliance
Behavioural and 
psychological
Behavioural attributes of fishers, incl. attitudes towards risk- taking and non- compliance
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models). We used deviance explained, effect size, p- values and find-
ings from thematic analysis of qualitative data to interpret how well 
our models explained spatiotemporal effort.
2.8 | Investigating non- compliance
Exploratory analysis revealed the low predictability of non- 
compliance using statistical modelling, as a function of vessel 
characteristics (further details and table of results included in 
SD 5: Modelling non- compliance). Therefore, we opted for a de-
scriptive multivariate analysis to identify the characteristics of 
non- compliance. Based primarily on insights generated through 
thematic analysis, we identified the following characteristics as 
potentially important in influencing non- compliance: vessel size, 
annual catch worth, reliance on income from sharks, annual ves-
sel running costs, average distance travelled and non- compliance. 
PCA was used to identify key characteristics driving variance be-
tween vessels and provisionally identify clusters of vessels. Then, 
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) was used to refine clusters. 
‘Ward's’ method of agglomerative hierarchical clustering was 
chosen as it provided the strongest clustering structure (agglom-
erative coefficient of 0.95), and the elbow method was used to 
define optimal cluster number. All analysis was done using the 
FactormineR package (Lê et al., 2020) and visualised with factoex-
tra package (Kassambara & Mundt, 2020).
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Vessel and fisher characteristics
Overall, a total of 95 fishers completed both interview activities (50 
in site 1 and 45 in site 2). Refusal rate was relatively high (~25%) 
mostly owing to the time demands of the survey. Fishers had, on 
average, 26 ± 10 years' experience, and all were reliant on fishing for 
100% of their income, with 72% expressing they were satisfied, or 
extremely satisfied, with their income. Median vessel earnings were 
$78,175 per annum (interquartile range = $58,896). Sampling cover-
age was estimated, using national vessel registration data, as 25% 
and 22% of registered vessels in sites 1 and 2 respectively (National 
fisheries data, 2019). If we assume representative sampling, then 
earnings across both sites potentially total $35,746,445 per annum, 
from 8,597,120 fisher days at sea. Vessels exhibited a range of char-
acteristics (Table 3), fishing behaviours and strategies (Figure S3), il-
lustrating the multifarious nature of the fleet.
Median trip duration was 30 days and most vessels (n = 85, 89%) 
reported fishing outside the Sri Lankan EEZ. Ninety per cent (n = 76) 
TA B L E  2   Hypothesised explanatory variables based on data exploration and key relevant literature analysis used in the modelling of 
spatiotemporal distribution of fishing effort (days)
Category Name Description Supporting evidence Source
Social Catch worth average catch worth ($) Thematic analysis of qualitative 
data
Derived from 
primary dataDistance to site distance of grid to the landing 
site(s) (kilometres)
Shark reliance proportion of fishing effort 
allocated for sharks (%)
Vessel size average size of vessels (metres)
Cost of fishing average cost of fishing ($)
Environmental Chlorophyll a (median) an indicator of primary 
productivity and available 
trophic energy (mg/m3)
Currie et al. (2004) and Rolim and 
Ávila- da- Silva (2018)
NASA (2020a)
SST (median) a proxy for latitudinal patterns 
in species diversity universally 
observed across taxa (°C)
Tittensor et al. (2010) and 
Friedland et al. (2020)
NASA (2020b)
SST (standard deviation) an indicator of frontal dynamics 
generating nutrient mixing and 
multilevel productivity (°C)
Queiroz et al. (2016)
Depth (mean) average seabed depth (metres) Letessier et al. (2019) and 
Tittensor et al. (2010)
GEBCO (2020)
Feature proximity Average distance to closest 
seamount or knoll feature 
(kilometres)
Letessier et al. (2019) and Tickler 
et al. (2017)
Yesson et al (2020, 
2021)
Policy Jurisdiction classification of grid location (SL 
EEZ, high seas, or FEEZ)
Arias et al. (2015) Derived from 
primary data
Distance to FEEZ distance from middle (centroid) 
of grid to closest FEEZ line 
(kilometres)
Kellner et al. (2007)
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of vessels that fished outside the EEZ held HSL, although 26% 
(n = 22) of them did not have the required working VMS. Vessels 
from site 2 travelled, on average, further than those from site 1 
(1,011 and 875 km respectively).
A range of targeting strategies were reported, with 25 unique 
combinations of gear and species provided. Most common gears 
were long- line (n = 68, 71%) and gillnets (n = 53, 66%). Over half 
of vessels (n = 45, 51%) reported using a combination of both and 
7.4% (n = 7) of vessels stated they had long- lines specifically adapted 
for targeting sharks. When asked to provide three target species 
in order of importance, fishers provided 15 unique target species 
assemblages. Tuna was the most common primary target species 
(n = 88, 94%), followed by Carangidae (e.g. Scads) (4%), billfish (e.g. 
swordfish; n = 1, 1%) and sharks (n = 1, 1%). Only 19% of fishers 
reported targeting sharks; however, 75% of fishers said that sharks 
contributed to their annual income (median contribution was 0.3%).
3.2 | Spatiotemporal distribution of fishing effort
Vessels targeted areas across the Northern, Southern and Western 
Indian Ocean (20.1°N to 12.4°S and 51.8°E to 89.8°E). Fishing effort 
was concentrated in the areas off SW Sri Lanka towards the Maldivian 
EEZ (Figure 2), although other notable hotspots included off NE Sri 
Lanka, the NE tip of the Maldivian EEZ and southern Indian EEZ. 
Overall, 53.9% was within high seas, 40.9% within the Sri Lankan EEZ 
and 5.2% in foreign waters (see Figure S4 for total fishing effort by 
country). Mapping indicated that vessels, on average, expended 7.2% 
of annual fishing effort within foreign waters, however a small sub-
set of vessels (10%, n = 9) expended >25%. Effort was focused along 
borders (Figure 2a), which fishers explained was due to perceptions 
of higher catch quantity and worth in these areas. One fisher summa-
rised ‘our vessels stay close to borders targeting fish which are inside the 
borders. They wait until the fish come out with the water current’.
Spatial distribution of effort varied as a function of target spe-
cies, with fishers targeting sharks travelling 1,292 km on average, 
50% further than those who did not (865 km). Hotspots of fishing 
effort for sharks were in distant waters (Figure 2b). Fishers explained 
that fishing trips for targeting sharks typically took longer due to 
the location of traditional sites, summarised by one fisher who said 
‘for a shark trip 60 days but for other 30 days’. Low levels of effort 
for sharks were present across many areas, however, and fishers ex-
plained they are often caught incidentally due to non- selective gear 
types. Only 1% of vessels said that sharks were their primary target 
species, yet sharks provided income for fishers in 74% of the grids 
and represented 7% of the fleet's total annual income.
Fishers often said trip distances had become shorter over the 
last 10 years, owing to economic factors, including increased fuel 
price and declines in catch prices which had decreased the profit-
ability of trips to distant waters. However, trip duration had report-
edly increased due to a decrease in fish populations across all areas, 
especially within the Sri Lankan EEZ, meaning it was taking longer to 
fill catch holds.
3.3 | Spatial modelling
The best GLM model explained 36% of the deviance in spatiotempo-
ral effort (adjusted R2), with ~14% explained by social variables, ~11% 
by environmental variables and 12% by SAC (Table S3). The effect 
of individual variables is shown in Table 4. Distance to landing site, 
catch worth, SST and feature proximity all had a negative effect on 
fishing effort (Figure 3). Distance to sites explained the most devi-
ance of the social variables (13%) and was an essential variable for 
all models (see Figure S5 for variable AIC weights). Fishers explained 
effort is lower in distant waters despite higher worth of catch due to 
higher fishing costs, for example ‘in the areas far away, we earn high 
income, but the expenses are really high’. Proportional effort for sharks 
significantly increased with distance from landing sites (p < 0.001). 
Similarly, policy variables, notably jurisdiction of the grid and dis-
tance to EEZ were both significant (both p < 0.001), suggesting 
they may affect spatial behaviour, but were not included in the final 
models. Vessel equipment also emerged as important from thematic 
analysis, as the absence of advanced cold storage (vessels are reliant 
on ice) purportedly influences fishing area choice. One fisher sum-
marised ‘it's because we have only a short distance to travel from here 
than to that place, so we can land the fish in fresh form’.
3.4 | Non- compliance
During interviews, 26% (n = 25) of fishers said they had fished in for-
eign waters at some point in the last 5 years and 14% (n = 14) of fish-
ers said they had done so in the last year. In contrast, 62% of fishers 
TA B L E  3   Characteristics of sampled vessels (n = 95) extracted 
from interviews. Mean, standard deviation (±) and range (Ra=) are 
given. Average reliance on sharks is defined as the proportion of 
annual fishing effort that is expended for sharks
Vessel attribute Sample fleet
Vessel Length 12.5 ± 1.5 (Ra = 9.1– 16.5) m
Crew size 5.3 ± 0.8 (Ra = 4– 7) pers.
Length of trip 30.5 ± 14.4 (Ra = 4– 77) days
Travelling time per trip 9.6 ± 8.6 (Ra = 1– 45) days
Number of trips (per annum) 9.5 ± 6.2 (Ra = 2– 45) trips per 
annum
High Seas Licence (HSL) 87.4%
Equipment (navigation and 
surveillance)
41% had both VMS & AIS
23% had VMS only
7.5% had AIS only
28.5% had neither
Annual catch worth $88,362 ± 51,010 
(Ra = $16,032– $238,500)
Annual fishing days 224 ± 66 (Ra = 110– 330)
Reliance on sharks 6.6 ± 15.8% (Ra = 0%– 100%)
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mapped some (>0.1%) of their annual fishing effort within foreign 
waters. We compared our results with a previous study (Gunasekara 
& Rajapaksha, 2016) that used available data from VMS to map dis-
tribution of the same IMUL fleet. We found our data potentially indi-
cate a higher level of non- compliance (Figure 4).
The analysis of qualitative data identified potential variables ex-
plaining non- compliance. Perceptions of higher catch were most fre-
quently mentioned (58% of all surveyed fishers), followed by higher 
catches of sharks specifically (13% of surveyed fishers) and eco-
nomic necessity (13% of surveyed fishers). The results of thematic 
coding to identify important variables explaining non- compliance 
are shown in Table 5.
3.5 | Characteristics of non- compliant vessels
PCA revealed 69% of the variability in the chosen characteristics of 
vessels was explained by the first (PCA1 = 52%) and second principal 
components (PCA2 = 17%) (Figure 5c). Four characteristics contrib-
uted almost equally to PCA1, including average catch worth (25%), av-
erage distance travelled (24%), average vessel running costs (24%) and 
size (21%) (Figure 5a). In contrast, non- compliance only contributed 
0.1% to PCA1, but contributed the most (9%) to PCA2 (Figure 5b). 
Distribution of sampled vessels in relation to PCA1 and PCA2 is shown 
(Figure 5d), as well as the direction of effect for each characteristic.
HCA identified four homogenous clusters of fishers based on 
similar shared characteristics, with an agglomerative coefficient of 
0.9, suggesting good cluster structure (see Figure S7 for HCA den-
drogram). Most (78%) vessels were associated with clusters char-
acterised by high compliance, with medium and low compliance 
associated with the smallest clusters (6% and 16% respectively). 
Clusters associated with medium and low compliance had highly 
variable associated characteristics, as shown in Table 6. Vessels that 
expended ~10% of their effort within foreign waters (not including 
India) were associated with high reliance on sharks (63.8%) and long 
distances travelled. Vessels that expended ~30% of their effort in 
F I G U R E  2   Distribution of fishing 
effort (LOG10[fishing days + 1]), for 
all vessels (a), Distribution of fishing 
effort (LOG10[fishing days + 1]), for 
sharks (b), Distribution of fishing effort 
(LOG10[fishing days + 1]), for tunas (c). 
EEZs indicated by black lines
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foreign waters (including India) travelled shorter distances, earned 
less and were less reliant on sharks (~1.8%). Within cluster variance 
was high for characteristics, including non- compliance (Figure S8).
3.6 | Trends in non- compliance
Overall, there was a broad consensus that non- compliance had 
decreased, because of enhanced enforcement of FEEZs, national 
regulatory changes (including introduction of HSL) and widespread 
uptake of VMS (see Figure S9 for coverage of monitoring and surveil-
lance equipment on sampled vessels). The analysis of interview data 
suggested that 24% of surveyed fishers had been arrested for fishing 
illegally in foreign waters at some point but only 8% of fishers had 
been arrested over the last 5 years. One fisher opined ‘now the boats 
which go to other countries' waters are less as there is a higher possibility 
to get caught than before’. With regard to VMS, one fisher said, ‘now 
the technology is developed, and the thinking pattern of people also has 
TA B L E  4   Explanatory variables, effect on response (p), deviance explained for best GLM (De) and importance across all possible models 
(AICw)
Response Category Explanatory variable p De AICw
Fishing days Social Distance to sites <0.001 13% 1
Shark reliance <0.001 1% 0.9
Catch worth <0.001 >1% 0.9
Environmental Feature proximity <0.01 >1% 0.9
Depth N.S >1% 0.3
SST (median) <0.001 8% 1
SST (sd) <0.001 2% 1
Chlorophyll (median) <0.001 n/a 0.7
Policy Jurisdiction <0.001 n/a 0.6
Spatial autocorrelation (SAC) <0.001 12% 1
F I G U R E  3   Partial effects of 
explanatory variables on fishing effort 
(days) in the model while considering 
the other variables are held constant. 
Relationships between fishing effort and 
distance to sites (a), shark reliance (b), 
catch worth (c), SST (median) (d) and SST 
(sd) (e). Coefficient effect estimates for all 
variables in the model are also shown (f)
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changed’. Interestingly, however, fishing effort in foreign waters was 
highest for vessels with VMS (8.5%), followed by vessels without ei-
ther VMS or Automatic Identification System (AIS) (7.6%). Vessels 
with both VMS and AIS had the lower fishing effort in foreign waters 
(5.3%) (Figure S9). Advances in VMS were welcomed by many fish-
ers, who explained this increased safety and decreased likelihood 
of accidental non- compliance. One fisher stated, ‘fixing VMS is best 
because people know where they go. It's not favourable when it comes 
to profit but it's better than getting caught and suffering’. Multiple fish-
ers highlighted negative impacts of non- compliance, including long 
periods of unemployment, saying ‘if I get caught, I have to suffer a lot 
as well as my entire family’.
4  | DISCUSSION
The drivers of fishing effort distribution and compliance with 
spatial marine management policies are both critical research 
F I G U R E  4   Comparison of identified fishing areas for the Sri 
Lankan IMUL fleet taken from our study results (highlighted in 
blue) and a report of VMS data adapted from Gunasekara and 
Rajapaksha (2016) (highlighted in pink). VMS data were taken from 
1,311 boats, operating 3,275 trips, from January to April 2016
TA B L E  5   Potential variables explaining non- compliance identified from thematic analysis of qualitative data collected during interviews 
and participatory mapping with all surveyed fishers (n = 95)
Name of factor Description Evidence of importance Illustrative quote(s)
Economic gains Fishers explained that higher catch 
within FEEZs allows vessels to fill up 
quicker, spend less money on costs 
and return to landing sites quicker to 
prevent degradation of fish
• 58% of fishers mentioned higher catch as 
a primary factor
• 14% said non- compliant vessels are 
pursuing higher profits than other (law- 
abiding) vessels.
• Annual profits were $17,585 higher, on 
average, for vessels that expended >25% 
of effort in FEEZs
‘It's mainly because more fish could 
be obtained from those areas. Fish 
in Sri Lankan waters and even in 





Fishers said vessels target sharks 
as they are high value, well- suited 
to vessel equipment and degrade 
slower. Perceptions of higher shark 
populations in FEEZs reportedly 
motivate vessels to target these areas
• 13% of fishers mentioned targeting of 
sharks as a primary factor
• Fishers provided waypoints for targeting 
sharks that were within FEEZs
• Contribution of sharks to annual catch 
worth was much higher (21%) than 
average (6.6%) for vessels that expended 
>25% of their fishing effort in FEEZs.
‘Most of the time they go to other 
countries to catch sharks’
‘There are some vessels who only go 




Fishers explained high running costs 
of larger vessels incentivise them to 
target FEEZs to recoup costs and 
repay debt
• 13% of fishers said high running costs of 
larger vessels were a primary factor
‘In these waters we don't have 
fish. Those big boats have lots of 




Fishers explained that different 
perceptions of risk of capture may 
affect behaviours
• Differences in perception of risk among 
fishers were mentioned by 6% of fishers
• Data highlight large disparity in 
perception of risk of capture, from 0% to 
100%, average was 30.6% (± 34.3)
‘Very low chance of capture’
‘75%; those countries have good 
technology and can easily find out 
when we cross borders’
Social norms Fishers explained that perceptions 
of others engaging in activities may 
increase non- compliance
• Non- compliance was higher at site 1 than 
site 2 (56%: 44%)
• Fishers that admitted non- compliance 
were more likely to think others also 
were (Figure S6)
‘We listen to the radio signals and 
when our friends tell that there is a 
good place to get a good catch, we 
sail to that place’
Social network Fishers explained that groups of vessels 
may engage in non- compliance in a 
coordinated manner, to engage in 
illegal activity
• 6% of fishers said groups of vessels, 
characterised by either owner 
or targeting strategy, engage in 
non- compliance
‘There is a specific group who 
mainly target sharks. There is one 
company all of his boats go there 
only’
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and management aspects (Battista et al., 2018; McCluskey & 
Lewison, 2008; Oyanedel et al., 2020). We examined these issues 
for a highly mobile fishing fleet suspected of historical and ongoing 
non- compliance. Our approach is novel, and our findings highlight 
the importance of continued advancements in monitoring and man-
agement of fleets. Further, our results show how participatory and 
social data can produce nuanced, detailed understanding of fleet 
movements, which may be omitted by relying on VMS alone.
4.1 | Spatiotemporal effort distribution
Our results re- emphasise that fisheries effort is related to both so-
cial and environmental dimensions (McCluskey & Lewison, 2008). 
Distance to landing site, previously highlighted as influential of fish 
population status at the scale of the EEZ (Letessier et al., 2019; 
Maire et al., 2016), emerged as the most important social vari-
able. This has previously been identified as an important factor in 
F I G U R E  5   Principal component 
analysis of vessel characteristics. 
Contribution of variables to PCA1 (a) and 
PCA2 (b), scree plot showing variance 
explained by each dimensions (C), biplot 
demonstrating the direction of effects 
of variables on PCA1 and PCA2 (d), with 
vessel clusters (group 1– 4), identified by 
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, highlighted 
by ellipses with a 95% confidence interval. 
Mean points of groups (barycentres) are 
shown as larger symbols













Small vessels, travelling short distances, 
low catch earnings, low reliance on sharks





Large vessels, travelling medium distances, 
high catch earnings, low reliance on 
sharks





Small vessels, travelling short distances, 
low- medium catch earnings, low reliance 
on sharks








Large vessels, travelling long distances, 
medium- high catch earnings, high 
reliance on sharks
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fisher decision- making within coastal regions (Cabanellas- Reboredo 
et al., 2014) but, to our knowledge, has not been documented as 
an important driver of fleet behaviour on the high seas (Kroodsma 
et al., 2018). Both catch worth and proportional reliance on sharks 
also emerged as important social variables, emphasising the impor-
tance of economics in driving effort. The economic profitability of 
fishing in high seas areas is highly variable among fishing fleets, 
dependent on factors such as fuel price and catch worth (Sala 
et al., 2018), and spatial distribution of this fleet is likely to be af-
fected by future changes in either. We investigated the role of 
spatial management policies on fleet behaviour, and found it had 
a significant effect, confirming the role of political boundaries in 
fisher decision- making. Overall, the patterns of effort distribution 
were generally consistent with the reports from VMS (Gunasekara & 
Rajapaksha, 2016). However, our study approach adds understand-
ing of non- compliant effort, showing a complementary and more nu-
anced picture.
4.2 | Non- compliance
We provide detailed empirical evidence of non- compliance for this 
fleet, the occurrence of which has previously been documented by 
enforcement records (Martin et al., 2013), shark telemetry research 
(Tickler et al., 2019) and social studies (Amarasinghe, 2003, 2013). 
The findings of non- compliance contrast with previous studies that 
used VMS data to show the fleet was broadly compliant (Gunasekara 
& Rajapaksha, 2016). We suggest VMS may only provide par-
tial coverage due to incomplete uptake and fishers actively turn-
ing it off. Heterogeneity in compliance levels within the fleet was 
evident and qualitative data identified potential decreases in non- 
compliance during the study period. We highlight that the bulk of 
non- compliance was conducted by a small, active minority, but likely 
had negative implications for all resource users and effectiveness of 
spatial management policies, such as MPAs, within the region (Arias 
et al., 2015).
Our research explored potential motivations for non- 
compliance, which are highly context specific (Petrossian, 2015). 
Perceptions of economic gains, when expected benefits ex-
ceed cost of non- compliance, are important (González- Andrés 
et al., 2020; Le Gallic & Cox, 2006) and we identified an associ-
ation between non- compliance and desire to increase earnings. 
This was moderated by other economic factors previously iden-
tified as important, notably overcapacity and overfishing in tra-
ditional fishing areas (Sumaila et al., 2006). Perceived economic 
gains from illegal fishing are moderated by perception of risk of 
capture (Sumaila et al., 2006) and we observed highly variable per-
ception of risk among fishers and evidence that this was linked 
to non- compliance likelihood. We also found evidence that tar-
geting of sharks is associated with non- compliance, supporting 
research linking high populations of species viewed as valuable 
in marine areas to non- compliance (Carr et al., 2013; González- 
Andrés et al., 2020; Petrossian, 2015; Raemaekers et al., 2011). 
This has important management implications and highlights the 
importance of understanding social drivers for shark fisheries 
when considering compliance (Collins et al., 2020). The role of 
social norms (the behaviour of others and what they approve of) 
on compliance is increasingly acknowledged and studied (Battista 
et al., 2018; Hatcher et al., 2000). Our thematic analysis results 
suggest that interpersonal and community links within the Sri 
Lankan fleet may be an important factor to consider for manage-
ment of non- compliance.
4.3 | Management insights
Our study highlights the potential of participatory data for un-
derstanding and managing species- specific effort distribution of 
highly mobile fishing fleets (McCluskey & Lewison, 2008). We 
demonstrate frequent interaction with vulnerable non- target spe-
cies, such as sharks, across the fishing range (Dulvy et al., 2008; 
Worm et al., 2013). Sharks are increasingly protected across their 
Indian Ocean ranges, including bans on exploitation in the Maldives 
and BIOT. However, there is an identified need to refine and bet-
ter enforce the spatial protection of population refuges (Letessier 
et al., 2019). We demonstrate how participatory data can incorpo-
rate fisher knowledge on population distribution and highlight bio-
logical hotspots. Accordingly, we advocate for further discussion of 
how spatial management policies can increase protection afforded 
to sharks.
Based on our study results, we advocate for increased data shar-
ing regarding non- compliance across this region and, at a national 
level, an investigation of factors limiting the uptake of VMS to ad-
dress partial monitoring of this fleet. Overall, however, our findings 
highlight that individual decisions to engage in non- compliance are 
highly context specific (Arias et al., 2015) and management interven-
tions should be adapted to these local contexts (Petrossian, 2015). 
We suggest increases in localised, targeted interventions designed 
with specific vessel characteristics or variables in mind. For exam-
ple, further study of the importance of social network connections 
among non- compliant vessels for coordination of non- compliant 
activities, which fishers suggested, may be an important motivating 
factor.
4.4 | Study limitations
In this study, we identify shortcomings in using vessel tracking tech-
nologies alone to understand fleet behaviour and highlight the com-
plementary use of participatory and social data (Thiault et al., 2017). 
However, our results should be interpreted in context. Firstly, it is 
unclear as to what extent they are representative of the whole Sri 
Lankan fleet, as we chose to sample two sites only. In addition, our 
model had relatively low explanatory power, indicating that other 
important variables may be important to consider. For example, sea-
sonality is identified as a key driver of fleet behaviour across scales 
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(from small- scale fisheries to large- scale industrial fleets) (Béné & 
Tewfik, 2001; Guiet et al., 2019; Pérez- Jiménez & Mendez- Loeza, 
2015). However, the bulk of effort reported by fishers for this study 
was not seasonally resolved and therefore could not be retained for 
further consideration. Other factors identified as potentially im-
portant during thematic analysis, but not included in spatial model-
ling, include the influence of social networks and traditional fishing 
patterns. In order to further resolve the explanatory power of our 
models, further analysis on subsections of the fleet, and over shorter 
time frames, may better capture seasonality and the influence of so-
cial networks.
Our findings regarding non- compliance should also be con-
sidered in context. Mapping produced higher estimates of non- 
compliance than Direct Questioning (DQ). DQ has been associated 
with introduction of bias when addressing sensitive topics (Solomon 
et al., 2015), particularly when relationships with participants are not 
established (Mann, 1995). Accordingly, we identified no- response 
bias and response bias within our study, as participation was refused 
by fishers and some admitted concealing non- compliant behaviour. 
Efforts were taken to eliminate these records, resulting in deletion 
of five participants' data; however, we advocate for further research 
into non- compliance using specialised methods, such as unmatched- 
count techniques (Nuno & St. John, 2015). This would help to es-
tablish potential effects of identified variables on non- compliance, 
and strengthen management recommendations (McCluskey & 
Lewison, 2008).
5  | CONCLUSION
Our study has two main important policy implications. Firstly, our 
results highlight the importance of integrating social dimensions into 
understanding of spatial behaviour of high seas fleets and predict-
ing and managing non- compliance with spatial management policies 
(Arias et al., 2015; Fulton et al., 2011; Pons et al., 2018). Secondly, 
we highlight that monitoring of high seas fleets using vessel track-
ing technologies alone may create an incomplete picture. We show 
the potential value of complementary approaches, such as collection 
of participatory data, to build a complete understanding of illegal 
fishing. We advocate for more nuanced approaches to combatting 
non- compliance across scales (Österblom et al., 2011), including 
local- level interventions.
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